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 Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
• Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)   Associate Professor 
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David Moore, Peter Ito, Stuart Young, Kevin Burgess, and Peter Antill, 
Cranfield University 
International Perspectives of the Impact of Export Control and 
Technology Transfer Regimes: The F/A-18 Case Study 
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Alfred G. Volkman—Director, International Cooperation for the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics).  Mr. Volkman is responsible for establishing international 
Armaments cooperation policy, ensuring that policy is properly implemented, and engaging with U.S. 
allies and friends around the world to achieve closer cooperation. 
Mr. Volkman has a long history in international cooperation beginning in the late 1970s when he 
negotiated the initial agreements with the United Kingdom that resulted in the cooperative 
development of the AV-8B Harrier Aircraft.  In the early 1980s he served on the NATO Air Command 
and Control Systems team in Brussels, Belgium, where he was instrumental in shaping the 
international acquisition strategy for that program.  Mr. Volkman has served in a variety of 
international staff positions for both the Department of the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense. 
Mr. Volkman has extensive acquisition experience.  He began his civilian career as a contracting 
specialist and contracting officer with the Naval Air Systems Command and has served as both the 
Director of Contract Policy and Administration and the Director of Foreign Contracting in the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense. 
Mr. Volkman has a Bachelor of Arts degree from Valparaiso University and a Master of Business 
Administration from George Washington University.  He served as an officer in the United States 
Army from 1966 to 1969.  His service included one year with the Military Assistance Command, 
Vietnam.  He has received numerous awards and medals for distinguished performance throughout 
his military and civilian service. 
Mr. Volkman is married and has three adult children. 
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 The Impact of U.S. Export Control and Technology Transfer 
Regime on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Project—A UK 
Perspective 
David Moore—Mr. Moore worked in purchasing, logistics, and supply chain management within the 
public sector and commercial organisations before entering academia.  He has designed, developed, 
and delivered a range of professional courses, undergraduate and master’s programmes for 
organisations and universities.  He has undertaken extensive education, training, speaking, and 
consultancy assignments in the UK, USA, Europe, Middle East, and Far East.  Particular interests 
include outsourcing, using contractors for service provision, developing professionalism, and 
humanitarian logistics.  He has written a number of books, book chapters, and conference and journal 
papers.  Moore completed his service in the Royal Logistic Corps as a Lt Colonel in 1999. 
[d.m.moore@cranfield.ac.uk] 
Peter Ito—Mr. Ito earned a bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of California at 
Berkeley, and a Juris Doctor (law) degree and a master’s degree in International Affairs from George 
Washington University in Washington, DC.  He worked for 25 years as a Foreign Service Officer for 
the U.S. State Department, serving in South Korea, Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, and 
Washington, DC.  His primary focus was political affairs, particularly defence and security policy.  He 
joined Cranfield University in September 2007, working as a researcher in the areas of strategic 
management and change management, before moving to his current position. [p.ito@cranfield.ac.uk] 
Stuart Young—Mr. Young retired from the Royal Navy as an engineer officer in 2008, having served 
in a variety of postings at sea and in the UK Ministry of Defence.  These included three years based 
in the British Embassy in Washington as a technical liaison officer, and as programme manager for a 
major multi-national technology development programme.  In his final appointment he was 
responsible for the development of acquisition management skills for military and civilian personnel 
across the MoD.  Joining Cranfield University in 2008, he is Deputy Director of the Centre for Defence 
Acquisition, with a particular interest in the relationship between the MoD and industry, and the 
development of acquisition strategies for major defence programmes. [s.young@cranfield.ac.uk] 
Kevin Burgess—Mr. Burgess has both private and public-sector experience. In the past 20 years he 
has held a range of senior management and executive roles in asset intensive industries, namely 
Telcos and Railways. Prior to joining Cranfield, Mr. Burgess’s last job in industry in 2008 was as 
Group General Manager, Shared Services in QR (a railway with over A$ 3 billion annual revenue and 
15,000 staff). In this role he reported directly to the CEO, had 985 staff, and A$600 million annual 
operating budget. His corporate-wide responsibilities included information technology, project 
management (capital program of A$10 billion), learning and development, supply (A$ 1 billion p.a.), 
HR services, financial services, property (A$600 million in assets), and rollingstock engineering. He 
has 10 years experience as a Business Excellence Evaluator (U.S. equivalent of the Baldridge 
Award). His academic interests have been primarily on integrating social and technical systems in 
order to improve overall corporate performance. His PhD was in innovation in supply chains.  He is 
widely published and currently holds the title of Adjunct Professor in three Australian Universities. 
[k.burgess@cranfield.ac.uk] 
Peter Antill—Mr. Antill is currently a research assistant working for Cranfield University at the UK 
Defence Academy's College of Management and Technology in Shrivenham.  Mr. Antill has practical 
experience in the service industry as well as the civil service.  A degree holder from Staffordshire 
University and the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, he also holds a PGCE (Post 
Compulsory Education) from Oxford Brooks University.  A published author, he is currently 
conducting postgraduate research into British defence policy, historical procurement programmes, 
and expeditionary operations, as well as privately collaborating with two colleagues in a military 
history project. [p.antill@cranfield.ac.uk] 
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The research assessed the international impact of the U.S. export control and 
technology transfer regime, with a focus on the UK experience with the U.S. 
requirements as they relate to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and the impact on 
logistical support for the JSF fleet.  UK government and industry representatives 
indicated agreement with the goals of U.S. policy, skepticism regarding the impact of 
those policies on effective project management, and harsh criticism of the process by 
which the U.S. controls are implemented. 
The data indicated that interviewees found U.S. requirements generated significant 
delay, increased costs, dampened initiative to increase capability or efficiency, 
established critical and unnecessary restrictions on information sharing, and 
constructed barriers to effective supply chains.  The UK representatives believed that 
the U.S. has generated a complex system which attempts to regulate all items, and 
thereby fails to provide a focus on effective security for truly sensitive items.  With 
regard to the impact of U.S. requirements on the future JSF logistical support 
arrangements, it was too early in the process for UK interviewees to have solid 
views.  There was great sympathy for UK firms to design around U.S. requirements 
and avoid becoming enmeshed in the U.S. regime. 
“In all candour, I would encourage UK industry to design around the U.S. 
International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and produce ITAR-free items.” 
–Rt. Hon. James Arbuthnot, Chairman of the UK House of Parliament Defence 
Committee 
 
“One of our suppliers had a fire at their facility.  We determined that it was better to 
wait for them to rebuild their facility than try to get U.S. approval for an alternate supplier.” 
–UK Industry Representative 
Background to the Research 
The research project assessed the international impact of the U.S. export control and 
technology transfer regime and was conducted jointly by Cranfield University and the U.S. 
Naval Postgraduate School.  Cranfield focused on two specific areas: the UK experience 
with the U.S. requirements as they relate to the JSF (or F-35), and the impact of U.S. 
regulations on logistical support for the worldwide JSF fleet.  The goal of the research was 
to generate insights into the nature and extent of the impact of U.S. requirements and 
identify alternate approaches to the current regime.  The focus was on ascertaining the UK 
perspective on the actual impact of ITAR regulations with regard to JSF, which could have 
utility in assessing the impact of those rules on cooperation with Allies and partners. 
The Cranfield researchers expected that the efforts would complement other studies 
of U.S. export controls, such as the report by Bialos, Fisher, and Koehl (2009).  However, 
the scope of this project permitted only a partial investigation of the entire question of U.S. 
policy and process.  And while there has been some initial consideration among UK 
participants on the major issue of logistical support for the JSF, and some of the areas of 
concern are already apparent, it would be worthwhile to conduct further research on this 
issue at a later stage when more decisions have been reached, and the support 
requirements and arrangements have become clearer. 
=
=
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb==== - 73 -  
=
=
 Research Methodology 
Cranfield received data from nine industry representatives and seven UK 
government officials working on the JSF.  There were 15 interviews conducted (in person or 
by telephone) within the framework of an extensive questionnaire, but the interviewees were 
encouraged to address any issues they thought were critical.  As a result, they covered a 
wide range of issues, ranging from broad policy to details regarding suppliers.  One 
individual provided purely written responses to the points in the questionnaire.  There are 
also 15 responses from those 16 interviewees to a separate, Likert scale questionnaire.  
The one exception was that of the Rt. Hon. James Arbuthnot, the Chairman of the House of 
Commons Defence Committee, where it was simply inappropriate to put the request for the 
completion of that questionnaire.  The industry responses are noted in bold and the 
responses from government officials are in italics and underlined. 
Each individual who participated in the interview was asked whether his/her 
comments were for attribution.  With the exception of Chairman Arbuthnot, all interviewees 
made clear that their comments were not for attribution.  The companies which participated 
in this research stated that they required an opportunity to review the Cranfield report to 
ensure that anything their employees said was not an inadvertent release of sensitive 
information.  Cranfield made clear that their right to edit only extended to the comments of 
their employees.  Cranfield will be holding the raw data from the interviews.  Should any 
reader wish to access the raw data, the request will need to go to the relevant company or 
government body, and that entity (or individual) will decide whether to provide access to the 
original material. 
It is important to note that the interviewees commented that it can be difficult to 
distinguish when JSF problems arose due to ITAR, and which are inherent in a process 
where UK firms are dealing with U.S. firms on a complex military project.  An additional 
complication is the fact that the UK firms do not generally deal directly with the U.S. 
government on ITAR-related requests, but need to pass them through a U.S. firm 
(particularly Lockheed Martin, the JSF prime contractor), although UK firms work with people 
from, for example, the JSF project office, as needed, to address specific issues. 
Experience of Interviewees on JSF and U.S. Requirements   
The individuals interviewed were selected as they are substantially involved with 
U.S. requirements and their impact on the JSF.  The interviewees were asked to provide a 
response to the statement “U.S. export control and technology transfer requirements had a 
significant impact on the conduct of my work on the JSF.”  Responses for the industry 
representative averaged 7.7.  For the government employees, excluding Chairman 
Arbuthnot (who has had an extensive interest on JSF and U.S. regulations), the average 
was 7.5. 
Strongly        Strongly   Do not 
Disagree        Agree       Know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  (1)  (1)   (3) (2) (2) (Ind.) 
   (1)  (1) (1) (1)  (2) (Gov.) 
Acceptance of Rationale for U.S. Export Controls 
Before addressing the details of how U.S. export control and technology transfer 
policy was implemented, it was worthwhile to gauge the extent of support among UK 
representatives for the goals of that policy.  The specific statement put to the interviewees 
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 was “There was a clear rationale for the U.S. requirements.”  There appeared to be a wide 
variety of views across the spectrum, with more support among industry representatives 
than government representatives.  For industry, the average was 6.8., and for government 
representatives, 5.5. 
Strongly        Strongly   Do not 
Disagree        Agree       Know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 (1) (1)   (2)  (1) (3) (1) (Ind.) 
 (1)  (1) (1) (1)  (2)                       (Gov.) 
What became noticeable in the conduct of interviews was that the commentary 
indicated substantial UK support for the idea that sensitive technology needs to be 
protected.  The fault may have been in the way the statement was phrased, as the 
“requirements” may have been thought to encompass the process as well as the policy, 
where there was little UK support for the former, but substantial understanding for the latter.  
One government representative stated there is no objection to a complex, intensive system 
for truly sensitive items.  An industry representative expressed full agreement with the 
rationale for U.S. regulations, and added that the justifications have been made clear.  Yet 
another industry interviewee commented that ITAR, strictly speaking, is not a problem. 
However, even the statements of understanding for U.S. policy were augmented with 
varying levels of criticism of U.S. practice.  One industry representative stated that the 
problem is that the regulations are too broad, and as there is no discrimination among items, 
the U.S. regime covers low-technology items as well.  One government representative 
opined that ITAR does not deserve its bad reputation, but ultimately commented that ITAR is 
a “well-maintained car which unfortunately is a Model T and not a Porsche.”  Another 
government participant stated that U.S. regulations are a minor irritant, and not a major 
problem.  However, even this interviewee described the U.S. system as “bizarre.” 
Critical Delays 
The most frequently cited criticism from UK representatives was that ITAR generates 
significant delays.  In response to the statement that “U.S. requirements generated major 
delays,” the responses from UK industry representatives averaged 6.0, and for government 
representatives, 5.3. 
Strongly        Strongly   Do not 
Disagree        Agree       Know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10                 
(1) (1) (1)  (1) (1) (1)   (3) (Ind.) 
 (1) (1)  (1)  (2) (1)                      (Gov.) 
One industry representative cited the estimate generally provided by interviewees 
that it takes 6–9 months for JSF requests to be processed in Washington.  That has an 
impact on numerous aspects of the project.  Another industry participant focused on the 
issue of suppliers and stated that the delay and loss of time is a “threat” to JSF.  As it takes 
so long to get approval for a new source or supplier, firms decide not to do so.  Regular 
suppliers raise prices knowing they have a guaranteed position, since the firm being 
supplied is not going to try to replace them with cheaper or better suppliers.  The 
interviewee said the delay is hard to fathom, as other countries process such changes in two 
months, and the UK can do it in days. 
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 Another industry interviewee addressed a different aspect of the issue of ITAR-
generated delay.  He stressed that the delay in U.S. processing has a particular impact on 
urgent requests from UK industry.  In some cases, the company will have a pressing 
requirement, but it is thrown into the process for consideration along with routine requests 
and the company cannot count on an expeditious response.  That can have practical 
impacts, such as production having to be slowed due to the need to wait for a U.S. decision 
on an unresolved technical issue. 
Yet another industry representative noted that difficulties arise from the fact that 
ITAR does not align with the work timeline.  The conflict between project timescales and 
ITAR timescales forces decisions to be made ahead of full information being available, 
especially long lead items which may need to be ordered within the first six months of the 
project.   Otherwise, firms are waiting for decisions from the U.S.  All of this delays design, 
building, and testing.  The example cited was that the company designed a piece of 
equipment against what it thought was the requirement.  It was clear from the onset that 
there could be deficiencies.  They ran the equipment, and there were indeed problems, but 
not the deficiencies that were anticipated.  The firm got new specifications and had to 
redesign the piece of equipment, all of which is normal in design of new equipment.  
However, delays generated from ITAR generated an extra year of work and added tens of 
millions of dollars in cost. 
Additional Costs: Less Than Optimal Supply Chains 
The issue of delay directly had an impact on the costs of suppliers for the JSF 
project.  Citing an example, an industry participant noted that bearings for a component of 
the JSF are made by one U.S. firm.  They could be acquired from a European firm at a lower 
cost and with a more secure supply chain.  However, ITAR makes it easier to stay with the 
existing supply chain and deters any effort to drive down costs and obtain greater security.  
The rough estimate provided by the interviewee is that there is an additional 30% increase 
in JSF unit costs due to the impact of ITAR. 
Another industry representative noted that a company cannot work with another firm 
without first getting U.S. approval, which makes it difficult for companies to make changes 
and improvements, particularly due to the long delays involved.  Indeed, ITAR forces firms to 
decide on the entire supply chain from the beginning, removing the flexibility which would 
allow for better decisions on suppliers.  The interviewee used a hypothetical example: a firm 
in Poland may be cheaper and better at providing a particular item.  But it is far easier for 
the UK firm to pick an approved supplier, even if it is not better or cheaper.  The interviewee 
also cited a concrete JSF example.  The firm sought to have supplier workshops which 
require amendment of the license.  After 14–16 months, the company was still waiting for 
approval as the U.S. continued to ask for details on issues such as who would attend, what 
information would be shared, and why more U.S. firms were not included. 
In short, as noted by another industry participant, ITAR leads to a sub-optimization in 
the performance of the supply chain.  The difficulty in adding approved firms to the list 
restricts the ability of companies to search for the best suppliers, which adds to costs.  It is 
not possible to use Chinese firms on the JSF.  But even with regard to a potential UK 
supplier, the issue is whether the UK firm is willing to wait 6–12 months for a decision on a 
new supplier. 
One interviewee noted that while some new suppliers may be worthy of 
consideration, they are not on the Technical Assistance Agreement (TAA).  That means a 9-
month wait for approval from the U.S.  The added complication is that the UK firm has to 
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 make the request to Washington through the U.S. firm with which it is working on the JSF.  
So the UK firm is hindered in numerous ways from getting the best suppliers.  As a result, 
the firm simply falls back on using old, approved suppliers, as it is difficult to conduct 
competitive tendering and search for replacement suppliers under a process that takes 
months rather than weeks.  This led the interviewee to cite the following example.  A fire at 
one of its suppliers made it impossible to get supplies, but the firm determined it was better 
to wait for the company to rebuild the facility, rather than seek clearance for a new supplier 
from the U.S. 
The interviewee noted that the UK firm has numerous prime suppliers, each of which 
may have numerous sub-tiers, with each of these possibly having even more sub-tiers.  Due 
to ITAR-driven requirements and timelines, the basic question is “who is approved,” rather 
than “who provides best value.”  As the representative noted, if approvals could come in 6–8 
weeks, this weakness in the process could be addressed.  That is not possible with a period 
of 9–12 months for approvals.  The effect for all suppliers generates inefficiencies and 
greater cost.  Ultimately, the costs simply get passed along from the sub-tiers to the prime 
suppliers to the U.S. prime and the U.S. government. 
Additional Costs: Generation of Extra Work 
One issue involved the extent to which ITAR forced UK firms to do more work than 
was otherwise needed for little apparent reason.  The statement on the Likert scale 
questionnaire was “U.S. requirements generated substantial additional work.”  For industry 
representatives, the average was 7.5 and for government representatives, 6.6. 
Strongly        Strongly   Do not 
Disagree        Agree       Know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  (1)  (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (3) (Ind.) 
   (1)  (1) (2) (2)                       (Gov.) 
One government representative asserted that ITAR requirements had generated a 
substantial amount of additional work.  With regard to specific examples of how that occurs, 
one industry participant returned to the issue of delay and suppliers, and questioned why it 
was necessary for the firm to go back to the U.S. for approval to work with a UK or 
European firm that had been vetted and approved elsewhere by the U.S.  Another industry 
interviewee noted another manner in which ITAR-imposed delays can generate extra work, 
citing the example of the development of a new component in coordination with a U.S. firm.  
The UK firm wanted to begin some of the initial work with the U.S. firm before the amended 
license approval arrived.  As that was not possible, the UK firm was forced to undertake the 
work under a more compacted and less efficient timetable. 
Additional Costs: Administration of ITAR 
Delay was only one ITAR-related cost that was cited by UK representatives.  Another 
involved administrative costs in connection with ITAR-compliance.  One industry participant 
noted that the company had to pull a lot of personnel together to form teams to address 
ITAR requirements, all of which generated administrative costs.  Another industry 
interviewee commented that 600 people in that company have been trained on ITAR details 
to ensure no mistakes occur.  And the company had instituted a new computer training 
program.  The interviewee added that many sections of the company were not familiar with 
ITAR, so there was an extensive amount of training which needed to be conducted, 
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 emphasizing the point that while this is not a problem for a large firm, small firms cannot 
afford this cost. 
Another industry representative stated that everyone in the company working on JSF 
gets ITAR training every year.  Indeed, knowledge of ITAR is essential for those people 
working on JSF.  The interviewee added that the rotation of U.S. personnel working on JSF 
means the UK often briefs U.S. officials on the requirements.  All of this has proceeded well, 
as the company is determined to avoid any ITAR breach, but entails time and effort to 
generate a change in the firm’s working culture.  One industry participant echoed the view 
that the company’s employees working on JSF may know more about the ITAR than U.S. 
firms.  The firm created a compliance team to work solely on JSF, which was something the 
company has never done before.  Personnel from the legal department, administration, and 
other departments were brought into the group.  The rest of the firm also became more 
aware of the significance of compliance with U.S. requirements, and also provided indirect 
support. 
Citing an example which went beyond JSF to the issue of the impact of U.S. policy, 
another industry interviewee made the point that the company now has an export control 
team, but did not establish it until 2002.  Until then, business was under straightforward 
government-to-government arrangements or old projects with established relationships.  For 
old projects, the existing licenses were assumed.  However, one item had been licensed to 
the firm in the 1950s from a U.S. firm.  Over the coming decades, the UK firm developed the 
item independently and added considerable intellectual property rights (IPR) to the point that 
it was essentially a distinct product.  The company had paid for the use of the IPR and had 
not even spoken to the U.S. firm about the item for a long time.  However, when U.S. 
sanctions against a particular country came into effect, the UK firm could not sell that item to 
that country due to the presence of a handful of parts to the original design.  The fact that 
there was no time limit on the ITAR control (any advanced technological information having 
ceased to be secret or innovative many years before) and the fact that no de minimus rule 
applied, was very frustrating and a good example of ITAR having impact far beyond what is 
reasonable.  That convinced the UK firm of the need for a unit focused on U.S. export 
control requirements. 
Additional Costs: Excessive Complexity 
One reason noted by UK representatives for the substantial costs involved in 
administering ITAR is that it is not an easy or straightforward process.  One industry 
participant noted that ITAR is complex, adding that while the key concepts are easy to 
understand, the devil is in the details and interpretation of the provisions.  What exactly 
constitutes “access”?  What exactly is “disclosure”?  The issues are black and white in some 
instances, but only if the individual or firm is familiar with the substance of ITAR. 
One industry interviewee stated there are illogical decisions from the U.S. and no 
consistency on what is military or non-military.  Elements of aircraft design and items such 
as stealth elements are clearly military.  But technical performance data for engines, like 
length of service, is not really a military issue.  Moreover, ITAR coverage provisions on 
“derived from” or “pertaining to” make it very wide-ranging and not clear to industry.  In 
addition, an industry representative stated that it is not clear what authorizations are for, as 
they are often vague.  Yet another industry participant stated that the ITAR definitions 
themselves are not precise.  Does a reference to forging constitute “technical data”?  And 
another industry interviewee added that ITAR, in some ways, is not difficult, but the key 
requirement is to have clarity on the regulations, which is currently not the case. 
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 Impact on Performance: General 
One other topic of substantial general interest among UK participants is the extent to 
which the ITAR may affect the ultimate performance of JSF.  As one industry representative 
stated, the rules make it difficult to push the technological envelope.  As a result, the 
decision is to do it in a “safe” way.  In addition, ITAR restricts the exchange of data to see if 
better technical solutions or improvements in capability or performance are possible.  And if 
the goal is to push for potential use of new technology, that requires a quicker turn-around 
on decisions from the U.S. than is being achieved under the current process.  As one 
government interviewee noted, while it is not possible to cite an instance where technology 
has been banned from being brought to JSF due to ITAR, it could well have had an impact 
by driving deliberations toward less technologically sophisticated systems. 
One industry representative cited the case in which the UK firm believed that a 
company from another European country was capable of filling a particular role on JSF.  
Unfortunately, it took a significant amount of time and effort to get U.S. approval to bring in 
that company.  While the result was successful in this particular instance, the interviewee 
noted that it would not be surprising if other firms decided not to pursue an option that could 
generate more performance, capability, or skills simply due to a desire to avoid the 
complications thrown in the way by ITAR. 
Another industry participant addressed the performance issue, and the impact of 
ITAR, from a different perspective.  The individual stated that if the question is put in terms 
of whether the item actually does what is required on the specification, then the answer is 
“yes.”  But the specification itself cannot be challenged, particularly as ITAR requirements 
make it difficult to get the information to re-evaluate those specifications.  Especially as 
performance data is export controlled, the only way it can be obtained to re-assess the 
requirement is by relying on data from others.  As the interviewee noted, using the traditional 
formula of obtaining 80% versus the last 20% of performance, ITAR hinders getting the 
remaining 20% of performance.  Another industry representative said that ITAR may not 
have killed any potential development of JSF technology, but it has affected the ability and 
willingness of industry to pursue possible avenues of technology development. 
Impact on Performance: Restrictions on Information Sharing 
The preceding discussion raised the issue of the extent to which ITAR has a 
significant negative impact on JSF and other projects by restricting the sharing of 
information.  A statement on the Likert scale questionnaire was “U.S. requirements inhibited 
opportunities to obtain necessary technical data.”  The industry responses averaged 8.2 and 
the government representatives, 5.0. 
Strongly        Strongly   Do not 
Disagree        Agree       Know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
   (1)   (1) (2) (3) (2) (Ind.) 
  (3)     (2)    (1) 
One industry representative noted, citing an example, that the interviewee’s team 
was tasked with designing a key JSF component.  However, it is not possible to design a 
component in isolation, and it is necessary to obtain large amounts of relevant data.  ITAR 
made it impossible to obtain this data, such as on operating margins and operating 
temperatures, so it was not possible to design the component in the most efficient way 
possible.  And the individual made clear that this was not a restriction of information due to 
IPR, but restrictions imposed by ITAR. 
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 The interviewee provided a second example in which the UK firm was not authorized 
to know about any additions or modifications undertaken by a U.S. firm to a particular JSF 
component.  The UK firm then had to produce items in which that component was used.  
Ultimately, the UK firm had to design around the U.S.-modified part, without knowing all the 
details.  This generated difficulties with regard to testing the complete unit, as well as how 
the entire system would operate, particularly with regard to certain performance scenarios.  
As a result, the solution was to send the whole system from the UK to the U.S. for testing 
and then return it to the UK.  The interviewee’s comment was that getting to 100% of the 
specified requirement was possible, but it took more time and effort, with additional design 
work necessary due to the barriers imposed by ITAR. 
As another industry participant noted, while a creative work-around can sometimes 
be found to obtain the required data, in other instances, the UK company’s response was 
simply to give up trying, particularly when the U.S. requirements are exceptionally 
impenetrable.  To cite one experience, there were provisos that were inserted that were 
marked “U.S. eyes only” even though the UK firm was working on the item. 
Impact on Performance: Restrictions on Nationals 
An additional aspect of the U.S. restrictions cited by UK representatives involves the 
focus on nationalities, which generates complications for the UK firm and serves as an 
inhibition on getting the best possible expertise from the broadest array of sources.  One 
industry participant noted that ITAR is the only export control regime which is based on 
nationality and not destination of items.  The interviewee’s firm has 53 nationalities working 
for it, and the company is banned by UK law from asking about the nationality of applicants 
for positions.  However, as part of its ITAR requirements, it has to list all nationalities, and an 
employee could be denied access to information due to the employee’s nationality.  In fact, 
noted the individual, reconciling UK law and ITAR requirements has still not fully been 
resolved. 
Impact on Performance: Working Relationships 
There are also intangible negative impacts from ITAR.  To attempt to address one of 
those areas, a statement on the Likert scale questionnaire was “U.S. regulations 
complicated work with other industrial participants.”  The responses from industrial 
representatives averaged 8.7 and for government representatives, 7.3. 
Strongly        Strongly   Do not 
Disagree        Agree       Know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
     (1) (1) (1) (1) (4)  (1) 
    (1) (1) (1) (1) (2) (Gov.) 
As one industry representative noted, ITAR adds an “additional bucket of sand” to 
working relationships.  It has a clear impact on communication with other companies 
involved in the JSF, particularly because of the limitations on information exchange noted 
previously.  ITAR requirements add complexity to what would be a normal interaction, which 
is particularly the case with high technology items.  While this is difficult to quantify, added 
the individual, it has a significant impact on working relationships.  As one government 
participant noted, the manner in which the U.S. handles sensitive items makes it 
exceedingly difficult for the UK, citing the example of one meeting at which a ridiculously 
small number of seats were made available for UK representatives.  One industry 
interviewee noted that at some JSF meetings, non-U.S. citizens were told to leave at certain 
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 points.  In one instance, that meant that the firm had one U.S. national remaining in the 
room, while the rest of the UK team was asked to leave. 
Concerns Regarding IPR 
The issue of IPR and ITAR has two different aspects.  The first involves the UK 
perception that U.S. firms use ITAR to protect U.S. IPR.  One industry participant 
commented that while work with other companies in other nations is always complicated, 
some U.S. firms use ITAR to protect their IPR.  One government interviewee concurred that 
the U.S. uses ITAR to protect the IPR of U.S. firms.  Another government representative 
noted that there are still numerous IPR issues involving JSF which need to be addressed.  
However, the interviewee shared the view that ITAR has been used by U.S. firms as a 
security device to prevent IPR from being passed on to competitors. 
The second issue involving IPR and ITAR involves the interest of UK firms in 
protecting their IPR, and the impact of ITAR on their IPR.  One industry interviewee noted 
that some of the work it has been doing in the UK is being moved to the U.S., and the 
concern of the UK firm is to ensure that there are no improvements done in the U.S.  The 
goal is to have the IPR on those products maintained in the UK.  Should any work be done 
in the U.S., it will become “contaminated” by ITAR and would have a long-term impact on 
the ability of the UK firm to use its original IPR.  As noted by one government representative, 
while firms want to work on a major project like JSF, they are concerned about protecting 
their IPR.  These concerns have led to difficulties with regard to integrating technology onto 
JSF, as European partners have been reluctant to share information on METEOR or 
ASRAAM with the U.S.  
One industry participant noted that a key factor is the difference in practice of U.S. 
and UK firms in military cooperative projects.  A firm wants control over sharing of 
information, as information is the life blood of the business and must be protected.  U.S. 
firms have minimal interest in IPR on military projects in which it participates, as that is 
funded by the U.S. government, and while companies own any IPR paid for by the U.S. 
government, the U.S. has an unlimited license to exploit and use.  Non-U.S. companies 
contribute intellectual property which has been funded privately or by other governments.  
Although there are processes to identify and protect this IPR, they are not accorded the 
respect which is expected or required.  Certainly, non-U.S. firms need to protect their IPR in 
such projects.  Moreover, UK firms have a concern about the U.S. government then sharing 
UK information with U.S. firms, added the individual, as the U.S. seems to assume it can do 
so when and if it wishes.  As a result, some UK firms will not want to participate in U.S. 
projects, and some smaller UK firms may decide they do not want to work with a larger UK 
firm in a U.S. project due to concerns about whether the U.S. will protect its technical 
information. 
Excessive ITAR-Control 
The preceding discussion touched on one of the key frustrations voiced by UK 
representatives: the unreasonably excessive reach of U.S. export control and technology 
transfer regulations.  The fact that ITAR controls come into play on the JSF is no surprise.  
However, when ITAR comes into play on projects such as the Eurofighter Typhoon, it 
generates intense UK frustration.  One government participant commented that the “viral 
effect” of ITAR is a problem.  One industry representative said the company asks why it has 
to put up with complex and onerous U.S. requirements due to the relatively small number of 
U.S. components in the Typhoon. 
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 One interviewee cited a particularly egregious example of ITAR-generated 
difficulties.  A test aircraft was flown in Austria with one ITAR component.  Retransfer 
approval was needed from the U.S., which said “yes” but included the proviso that the U.S. 
manufacturer of the component had to watch the test flight.  That involved the cost of an 
individual viewing one piece of equipment for months.  The representative stated bluntly that 
this is ITAR “insanity.” 
However, it is the issue of the impact of ITAR on IPR that generates greater 
frustration. One industry interviewee stated that ITAR is like “one drop of cyanide in a bucket 
of water.  Once you’ve put the smallest drop in, everything becomes contaminated.”  It 
makes it hard for the UK company, because it may want to find other uses for its products.  
To cite one example, the individual noted that a civilian product that goes to the U.S. and 
has something added which is ITAR-related (like special paint) becomes an ITAR-controlled 
item.  A firm wants to avoid having to produce two lines of items, so the company would not 
go to the U.S. and risk ITAR “contamination” for the whole product line.  These are illogical 
decisions, and have no consistency on what is military and non-military. If a product is 
developed and applied on a civil project, there would be no problems whatsoever.  But as 
soon as it is put on a military project, it becomes ITAR controlled. 
Specifically on the JSF, one government representative stated that there will be 
“contamination” when UK software is mixed with U.S. software, which will generate a 
problem for future UK sales to other countries.  With regard to UK industry, the 
“contamination” factor deters firms from bringing technology to projects like JSF.  In addition, 
it generates friction in the UK–U.S. relationship.  The UK feels UK technology is being 
“stolen” by the U.S. under ITAR.  Two examples are LED screen technology and night-vision 
goggles.  If there is co-development and technology sharing with the U.S., the U.S. then 
slaps on ITAR restrictions, and the UK cannot freely use the technology.  However, added 
the interviewee, it is not clear if this is a result of a deliberate U.S. policy or the lack of 
joined-up government in the U.S. regarding ITAR. 
ITAR as Trade Barrier 
Such comments indicate the perception among many UK representatives that the 
U.S. is using ITAR as a trade barrier.  One industry participant stated that U.S. firms use 
ITAR to protect their business interests on key areas such as work-share.  One government 
interviewee added that ITAR can be used as a hindrance to non-U.S. firms.  Another 
government participant stated that the result of the complications inherent in the U.S. 
process is that large U.S. firms take a default position of not working with non-U.S. firms.  
One industry interviewee cited an example in which the U.S. company it is working with on 
JSF used the ITAR as an excuse to defend a particular decision.  The example involved 
software developed for use in JSF.  The UK firm was informed by the U.S. company that it 
was excluded from this work on the basis of security concerns, but never received a clear 
response from the U.S. government or the U.S. company.  It was offered work on other 
systems, which it accepted, but the perception in the UK firm was that the U.S. company 
appeared to have used ITAR to cover a business decision, and the UK firm could not 
challenge the outcome. 
The interviewee added that the cynical view might have been that the U.S. company 
had simply wanted to have the UK firm on board to show that it had international 
participation in JSF.  Once the complexity of the working relationship became clear, the U.S. 
company may have decided that it was too difficult, and it would simply be better to work 
with U.S. companies.  To cite yet another example, the UK firm had noted its capabilities in 
yet another area of potential work with the U.S. company.  The U.S. company eventually 
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 responded that the U.S. government would not give access to the UK firm to work in those 
areas.  However, it again was not clear about the rationale behind that U.S. government 
decision, merely stating that for “reasons of affordability,” it would be handled as a 
responsibility of the U.S. company.  The interviewee stated that, as there was no 
transparency in the process, it is not clear if that outcome genuinely was due to a decision 
by Washington, or the U.S. company looking for an excuse to capture work in a strategic 
area and change an informal agreement that the UK firm would have that line of work. 
However, another industry representative provided the contrasting view that “if the 
prize is big enough and where this becomes a barrier to entry, I would expect UK industry 
would (1) push for a U.S. government ruling as opposed to accepting U.S. industry 
interpretation, or (2) look for UK government support in presenting a challenge.”  And it is 
notable that Chairman Arbuthnot expressed his view that he does not share the general 
perception that the U.S. government has a policy of trying to use ITAR as a trade barrier.  
Instead, he commented, it is more a case of individuals within different parts of the U.S. 
government acting in an unhelpful way.  Moreover, said the Chairman, it is a haphazard 
process in which U.S. officials seem to feel that it is not in the interest of U.S. industry to 
expedite the handling of ITAR requests. 
ITAR Process—“Sloppy Work” 
Chairman Arbuthnot’s comments crystallize the views of UK representatives that, 
whatever defense can be provided on the goals of U.S. policy, the implementation process 
is unacceptable.  Arbuthnot frankly stated that the ITAR regulations are not only 
unnecessarily bureaucratic, but are used as an excuse for “sloppy work” and added that the 
process hits “a number of buffers at a lower level of the bureaucracy in Washington.” 
One example cited by a government participant involved the UK acquisition of data 
regarding Chinook helicopters.  The UK obtained approvals from Boeing, the U.S. Army, 
and the Secretary of Defense.  However, “some Major, some place, said ‘no’ and ‘no’ was 
what stuck.” Speaking candidly, the interviewee commented that such incidents make the 
UK think that the U.S. “cannot be that incompetent,” so it must be an intentional U.S. policy.  
Another government interviewee stated that there are outrageous stories of U.S. decisions 
related to the JSF.  For example, Canada needed a JSF for an exhibition.  As the plane 
wound up taking a different route due to a bridge being closed, Washington required a new 
license.  One government participant cited a non-JSF example where the UK received 
approval from Washington, but a proviso was included that the data (telemetry) could not be 
given to the U.S. Army. 
U.S. Attitudes—Technology 
One complicating factor which has an impact on UK perceptions of JSF and U.S. 
policies involves the UK perception that the U.S. places little value on UK technology.  
Chairman Arbuthnot stated that the UK has a claim on a good industrial share of the JSF, 
which it deserves based on merit.  However, he continued, there is a sense that UK 
technology is not regarded seriously by the U.S., and as a result, there is a “humiliation” 
factor in the background.  One industry representative noted that the company had arranged 
a session with representatives of the U.S. government to show that the UK could bring 
quality technology to the JSF project.  However, the U.S. showed no interest.  One 
government representative stressed that the UK has areas of good technology, as do other 
European countries.  The U.S. should see it in its own interest to have a capable European 
defense industry as a partner, as well as to generate competition. 
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 U.S. Attitudes—Political Policies 
An additional complication arises from the impact of a variety of U.S. policy 
decisions.  One industry representative stated that U.S. “arrogance” makes it act like a 
“bully” without regard for requirements or export policies of other countries.  And the 
mercurial nature of U.S. policy changes makes it difficult to be assured of consistency in 
supply and support arrangements.  In cases in which long-term planning is required, there is 
a need for stability and security, and countries apparently have little faith the U.S. will 
provide such stability.  As an indication of how countries respond to the threat of those U.S. 
policy shifts, the interviewee noted that Switzerland purchased HAWK along with supplies 
and spares to last 25 years, in order to be assured of supplies. 
U.S. (and UK) Attitudes—Source Codes 
A discussion of U.S. attitudes with regard to the UK is the natural transition to one of 
the key JSF questions regarding U.S. export control and technology transfer policy: In light 
of the 2009 statement from the JSF project office that source codes will not be released, will 
the UK be denied access to JSF source codes?  Chairman Arbuthnot was quite explicit on 
the matter.  He noted that he had worked on this issue extensively for some time, and had 
emphasized that it is important for the UK to have the source codes.  In 1996, as Minister for 
Defence Procurement, he had the general view that UK participation in what would 
eventually be the JSF was beneficial to the UK.  However, he also believed the UK should 
pull out of the project if it could not have guaranteed access to critical items such as source 
codes.  That remains the key issue, stressed Arbuthnot, which is critical to the UK ability to 
upgrade the JSF as the UK wishes, without requiring U.S. approval.  And if the UK does not 
have that ability, it would be at the mercy of the U.S. 
Without resolution of this issue, continued the Chairman, the UK could not proceed 
with plans to use the French Meteor missile on the JSF.  This would effectively mean the 
end of the European missile industry.  The French firm MBDA, which is providing Meteor, 
will do the integration of the weapons system to the JSF and is central to the source code 
issue.  If MBDA is not able to have the access to source codes to handle weapons 
integration properly, this would be a major concern for the UK.  Arbuthnot stated that the 
Defence Committee is focused on the JSF source code issue and U.S. policy.  He 
emphasized that source code access relates to UK operational independence.  And without 
exaggerating the point, continued Arbuthnot, there is a certain UK “paranoia” regarding U.S. 
actions on the JSF. Some of this is based on past experience, such as when the UK was not 
told about changes the U.S. made to the size of the bomb bays for the JSF.  With regard to 
the 2009 JSF project office announcement on source codes, Arbuthnot noted that this is not 
a major concern for the UK at this time, as there are many more important issues which take 
priority and require the Committee’s attention.  However, stressed Arbuthnot, this matter 
could become important as the actual procurement decision on JSF comes closer. 
Aside from the Chairman’s comments, the views expressed by government and 
industry representatives about the UK eventually getting access to source codes ranged 
from cautiously optimistic to deeply skeptical.  One industry representative noted that the UK 
firm is still getting the code that it needs at this time, and there have been no problems for 
that firm.  While there had been difficulties getting source codes from the U.S., they 
eventually were provided.  The individual added that while it may not be all the firm wants, it 
is what the firm needs.  A government participant stated that the UK has had its 
expectations met so far, and has gotten what it needs on JSF up to this point.  The UK has 
said it will ensure it has operational sovereignty, which means the UK can do what it needs 
to do on the JSF, where and when it needs to do it.  If it is the case that upgrades are better 
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 done in the U.S., it is possible that this would not be a problem for the UK.  But on 
operations, there is no reason for the UK to anticipate problems with the U.S. 
Another industry interviewee stated that the firm has worked on JSF under an 
arrangement that assumes it will not get source code access.  This certainly generates 
difficulties resulting in the UK firm having to find complicated “work-arounds,” or simply 
having U.S. firms do the work.  Another industry participant stated that source code access 
has been a constant problem.  The UK firm was never allowed near anything associated 
with the software, which has not helped the UK firm in understanding how the systems work.  
The view of the interviewee is that this will remain an obstacle in the future, with UK firms 
not having a full picture of what systems are doing at the time failures occur. 
U.S. Attitudes—Practical Working Relationships 
The question arises how anything gets done on JSF or, in general, when ITAR 
comes into play.  The answer from UK representatives is that difficulties are often ironed out 
due to good working relationships.  One statement on the Likert scale questionnaire was 
“U.S. requirements had a significant, negative impact on the working relationship with U.S. 
officials.”  The responses from industry representatives averaged 3.0 and for government 
representatives, 3.0. 
Strongly        Strongly   Do not 
Disagree        Agree       Know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10                 
(1) (3)  (2)  (1)      (2) 
 (2) (1) (1) (1)   (1) (Gov.) 
One industry participant stated that he has regular contact with U.S. government 
officials on JSF and there have been no major problems.  Indeed, there has been strong 
support from the U.S.  The UK firm had 230–240 people working on the JSF in the U.S. 3–4 
years ago, and still has 80 personnel working on the project in the U.S.   And the U.S. has a 
dozen people on-site to work full time on security, supply, and other issues and adjudicate 
proposed changes.  The firm’s personnel in the U.S. have a good relationship with U.S. 
counterparts.  Certainly there are restrictions on UK personnel, but as they have been in the 
U.S. for a long time, the arrangement works well.  The working environment has developed 
over a lengthy period of time, and certainly in the JSF development phase, U.S. regulations 
have not been an insurmountable impediment.  However, they could be a concern in the 
future, conceded the interviewee, and the relationship will be tested more as JSF 
progresses.  Basically, U.S. behavior is geared to helping the UK firm despite U.S. 
regulations.  But the UK will need to push the U.S. for more dialogue. 
However, another industry representative, while agreeing that resolution of problems 
comes down to personal relationships, stated that when the firm works directly with 
Washington, things can get difficult.  To a degree, the firm has reasonable relationships with 
U.S. officials, and generally those individuals have been knowledgeable.  The firm works 
with the JSF project office to resolve problems and issues.  In the early stages, however, the 
firm got little instruction on the regulations, and the U.S. response was “just go read the 
ITAR.”  But as the working relationship developed, there was more U.S. help on getting 
clarifications. 
The UK firm and the JSF project office, noted the interviewee, can also have heated 
exchanges, mostly due to the delay in getting responses urgently needed by the UK firm.  
And sometimes the U.S. puts in provisos which the company did not expect, or at times 
does not even know about.  Much depends on the license, and a well-drafted broad scope in 
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 the license gives the firm the required flexibility.  On issues such as hardware or technical 
data, the license may be silent, so the company has to work to find a solution.  Usually that 
can be done, but it can take 2–3 months to get that answer out of the U.S.  One industry 
participant noted that the key was the attitude of the U.S. entity involved.  The JSF project 
office did not generate an “us versus them” culture, nor did Lockheed Martin.  However, 
other U.S. firms generated precisely the “us versus them” culture that made work difficult for 
UK firms. 
For UK government representatives, the general impression was of a cooperative 
arrangement with U.S. officials.  One government interviewee noted that the UK has some 
35 people at the JSF project office, Lockheed Martin, and the JSF testing facility.  These are 
UK personnel who are there in place of U.S. staff, not as a supplement to U.S. staff.  There 
have been no problems obtaining clearances for the UK personnel.  That has allowed the 
UK to acquire valuable experience, while also bringing UK experience in areas such as 
safety and logistics to the JSF project.  In general, if the UK wants data to be able to make 
decisions, it has gotten it from the U.S. 
UK Attitudes on U.S. Relationship 
One government representative forcefully asserted that the problem may actually be 
UK attitudes with regard to its relationship with the U.S.  The result is not a problem with 
what the U.S. requires under its export control regime, but how the UK assesses those 
requirements, and the assumptions it makes about U.S. actions.  In this individual’s view, 
the UK has such a firm adherence to a policy that it should be with the U.S. and use U.S. 
material, that this leads to “perverse” results.  To cite one example, at the onset of UK 
participation in JSF, the numbers provided by the UK government did not match the joint 
project numbers.  There were bad UK behaviors driving a policy to spend a “fortune” to buy 
U.S. equipment and stay in step with the U.S.  On JSF, stated the individual, the UK is 
ultimately paying a lot of money to be an exporting country just like any other JSF 
participating state.  There has not been any institutional learning displayed by the UK 
government.  The interviewee’s frank assessment is that the UK will not ultimately get 
everything it wants from the U.S., and “the UK will not have sufficient operational 
sovereignty on the JSF.”  But the individual’s perception is that the UK is too far into the 
project to change course. 
Chairman Arbuthnot echoed those points to a degree, stating that it is important for 
the UK and U.S. to work together in the defense area, noting that this could mean that the 
UK would simply buy defense material from the U.S. that it cannot produce itself.  But he 
added that it is important that both nations have capable, competing defense industries.  
And it is also important that Europe does not have to “knuckle under” to the U.S. 
ITAR-Free 
That last reference by Chairman Arbuthnot led to his strong statements on the move 
among UK and other European firms to produce ITAR-free items, as noted by Bialos, Fisher, 
and Koehl (2009, p. 20).  Arbuthnot frankly stated that UK industry wants to design around 
ITAR and proclaim that their items are “ITAR-free,” adding that this is something that should 
generate concern in the U.S.  He continued by stating, “In all candour, I would encourage 
UK industry to design around the ITAR and produce ITAR-free items.”  Why, asked 
Arbuthnot, design something that will become enmeshed in ITAR?  European defence 
cooperation is going forward, and that is not simply due to ITAR concerns.  It is a reflection 
of the benefits that are possible by working closely with an Ally, and is wrecked by ITAR. 
=
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 One government representative commented that, in general, there is growing 
sentiment in both foreign governments and non-U.S. firms to do whatever is needed to avoid 
entanglement with ITAR.  Another government interviewee concurred that experience has 
generated an impetus in UK industry to produce ITAR-free military items.  In France, there is 
a government policy of using ITAR-free items, and the trend is spreading throughout 
Europe.  Another government participant commented that France and Germany have gone 
to their industries and made clear they want ITAR-free goods, and there is anecdotal 
evidence that contractors, particularly in Germany and France, have indeed started to 
design components around ITAR.  One industry representative stated that customers are 
now asking for, and firms are designing, ITAR-free items.  For large items or older items, 
that is difficult.  But for new items, that is entirely possible.  To cite one example, on the A-
400M transport, AMSL has asked suppliers for items which are ITAR-free.  One industry 
participant commented that for small and medium-sized firms, it would make sense to do 
everything possible to avoid ITAR. 
Reform of the U.S. System 
All of the preceding comments indicate the overwhelming UK government and 
industry view that even with the most generous perspective of the U.S. system, it is 
fundamentally flawed.  Chairman Arbuthnot stated that it would be better if the U.S. followed 
what Secretary of Defense Gates is trying to do and generate tighter controls and higher 
walls on a smaller number of sensitive items.  In addition, the number of existing rules must 
be reduced.  Indeed, continued Arbuthnot, there would be a major impact if Secretary Gates 
is not successful in his efforts to reform the U.S. regime.  Difficulties would arise in any 
event, as the disparity between U.S. and European defense capabilities grow, but reform of 
U.S. regulations would have a major impact in addressing potential future problems. 
One government representative echoed the view that the way to improve ITAR would 
be to have higher walls on a smaller number of key items.  The U.S. has to identify the 
crown jewels that it wants to protect and then put greater protection around this small set of 
items.  The fact that the ITAR coverage in some instances now goes down to the level of 
controlling nuts, bolts, and screws is unnecessary.  And clearer, simplified regulations would 
make it easier for small and medium-sized UK firms to make a decision on whether they 
want to participate in a U.S. project.  With regard to the need for simplified, transparent 
processes, a single, integrated U.S. agency to make export control decisions is important.  
Even if the substance of the ITAR were unchanged, a better process would make a major 
difference.  And more reasonable actions by U.S. officials would generate a big 
improvement, if it removed the small, aggravating instances in which a small mistake 
generates the return of the entire application.   
Prospects for Reform 
Unfortunately, there appears to be substantial UK pessimism that the Obama 
Administration efforts to reform the U.S. export control and technology transfer regime will 
be successful.  Drawing on his personal experience, Chairman Arbuthnot cited one reason 
for skepticism.  He stated that when the UK Defence Committee has gone to Washington to 
speak to the executive branch about the need to reform a “broken” U.S. system, it is told to 
talk to Congress.  When the members speak to counterparts in Congress, the message to 
the Committee is to speak to U.S. industry.  And when the committee members speak to 




==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb==== - 87 -  
=
=
 One industry interviewee also expressed pessimism about the chances that the U.S. 
will improve and simplify ITAR.  One government participant provided a detailed rationale for 
the view that the prospects for export control reform are “poor.”  There is no evidence that 
congressional staff have any concept of how dangerous the current approach is for long-
term U.S. interests.  The message being delivered to congressional staff is to protect U.S. 
industry, and Congress appears to buy that message.  Moreover, the Obama Administration 
is still relying on parochial ways of addressing this topic.  As a result, the discussion of 
higher walls around fewer items sounds good, but the UK has heard this message before.  
Basically, there is a concern that congressional reaction remains an obstacle to serious U.S. 
reform. 
Logistical Support 
It appears to be too early in the process for UK representatives to have a concrete 
view on the general issue of JSF logistical support and the specific issue of whether the 
ITAR will have an impact.  One statement on the Likert scale questionnaire was “I anticipate 
that U.S. requirements will have a major negative impact on the ability of the UK to provide 
logistical support for the JSF.”  For industry representatives, the average was 7.2 and for 
government representatives, 4.1. 
Strongly        Strongly   Do not 
Disagree        Agree       Know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10                 
    (1) (2)  (3)  (1)  (2) 
 (1) (2) (1)     (1) (1) (Gov.) 
One industry participant noted that there is no expectation for country specific 
solutions regarding JSF logistical support, and the UK and other participating countries will 
be drawing from the U.S. support network.  Global solutions on sustainment requirements 
will be huge, and it is conceivable that Lockheed Martin will not be able to do it all, so UK 
and other firms will compete for whatever work is made available to other firms.  The 
interviewee said that UK firms could try to be the regional support lead, but it is too early to 
tell if that will happen.  Another industry interviewee stated that ITAR plays a role in 
company planning on JSF logistical support.  The U.S. is setting up the rules, which will be 
global, but there may be hubs around the world and assembly lines in differing countries.  
Such an arrangement would require ITAR licenses around the world.  In that regard, the 
interviewee noted that the U.S. should keep in mind that other countries, including the UK, 
have their own licensing regimes and requirements.  As noted by government 
representatives, that could lead to an interesting situation if countries such as Israel are 
brought in to the JSF.  The JSF is unique because of the extensive UK involvement in so 
many areas.  Indeed, noted one individual, it is a partly a UK aircraft. 
A government participant commented that in the early work on JSF logistical support, 
the UK is having fewer problems with the U.S. than with other states.  Indeed, at this time, 
the government does not see risks with regard to JSF support and supplies.  There is a 
public Declaration of Principles with the U.S. that makes it unlikely that the U.S. will refuse to 
supply the UK with what it needs on the JSF.  In general, the UK is looking to establish joint 
support chains with the U.S., although this could admittedly be tricky on the JSF. 
Another government representative stated that work on a variety of fronts regarding 
the JSF is picking up in intensity.  Pilots are now flying test versions of the JSF, logistics and 
support questions are being discussed, and infrastructure questions for the UK will get more 
attention.  On the general issue of support, the interviewee noted that industry is more 
=
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 concerned than the UK government at this point.  The UK is now getting access to what is 
needed at this time from the U.S. to make decisions on logistical support.  Some problems 
involve coordination with other countries and getting data on systems to assess integration 
issues.  In some cases, other countries have not given data, while the U.S. has provided 
what the UK has requested.  However, with regard to overarching UK support requirements, 
the individual emphasized that the UK will never send a JSF to the U.S. for service.  Such 
an arrangement will not be acceptable to the UK for basic reasons, such as delay, additional 
cost (fuel), and complication (tanker refueling). 
ITAR as a Cost of Doing Business 
With the minimal prospects for improvement of the U.S. system, the question which 
arises is the extent to which UK industry simply accepts ITAR as a cost of doing business in 
the U.S.  With the U.S. defense budget currently larger than the defense budgets of the next 
20 nations combined, is it simply worth it for UK industry to accept the difficulties inherent in 
the U.S. export control and technology transfer regime?  Reflecting the fact that there is no 
definitive answer, Chairman Arbuthnot stated that in some circumstances, ITAR makes the 
cost of doing business with the U.S. too high, while in other cases, it is an acceptable cost.   
The U.S. has supported the UK in the area of defense cooperation, but parts of the U.S. 
system generate serious difficulties and disincentives. 
The key problem, particularly for small and medium-sized UK firms, is the general 
negative perceptions of an inscrutable ITAR process.  One industry representative stated 
that ITAR generates “a certain amount of fear.”  In many instances, only 5% of the problem 
may arise from ITAR requirements, and 95% of the problem is a result of panic.  Another 
industry participant said that small firms probably are influenced by their perceptions of the 
difficulty of the requirements under U.S. regulations.  And one government interviewee 
noted that perceptions drive behaviors, especially in industry.  Those that have worked with 
ITAR and have experience can make the system work. 
From the industrial perspective, the cost of doing business by complying with ITAR 
highlights the different views of large versus medium and small UK firms.  One industrial 
representative stated that it is important for the individual’s firm to fight for JSF work.  There 
is a significant information technology multiplier, and the payback for the firm and for the UK 
in general is substantial.  And the industrial work and the potential income that can be 
generated are considerable.  The final numbers bandied about for the JSF project are 
around $400 billion.  If, for example, the UK were able to secure 10% of that amount, that 
would be huge.  And again, while the final arrangements on logistical support are far from 
being settled, if Lockheed Martin is not able to handle all the support solutions for the JSF, 
there will be a significant amount of work available for other firms, including UK companies. 
Finally, while the interviewees had scores of anecdotes to illustrate the aggravations 
of the U.S. regime, it is questionable whether the UK is ready to abandon all participation in 
U.S. projects.  One of the statements on the Likert questionnaire was “My experience with 
U.S. export control and technology transfer regulations leads me to question the value of UK 
participation in U.S.-led defence programmes.”  The responses on the industrial 
representatives averaged 3.5 and for government representatives 4.1. 
Strongly        Strongly   Do not 
Disagree        Agree       Know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10                 
(3) (1) (1) (1) (1)  (1) (1)                   (Ind.) 
 (2)  (1) (1)   (1)  (1)        (Gov.) 
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 The commentary from the UK participants would have indicated all the responses 
coming in at 9 or 10.  Certainly, the responses of industry participants were driven by the 
prospects of the business in the U.S.  But in general, it is notable that the aggravation and 
inefficiency generated by the U.S. regime was still not enough for the UK to say “enough is 
enough.” 
Conclusions 
In seeking to draw conclusions from the data provided by UK representatives, it is 
arguably best to do so by continuously asking the question “compared to what?”  First, most 
of the commentary is quite negative and indicates a substantial amount of UK 
dissatisfaction.  This should be a major concern for the U.S., as the UK is arguably the state 
which is most open to the idea of participating in U.S.-led multinational military projects.  
Compared to other nations, the U.S. should anticipate a sympathetic ear in the UK.  If this is 
the extent of UK criticism of the U.S. regime, Washington should dread hearing frank 
commentary from other countries. 
However, the second point of comparison is that the aggravation generated by the 
U.S. export control and technology transfer regime is still not great enough for the UK to 
walk away from U.S. projects like the JSF.  But as the attraction of participating in U.S. 
projects arises from the substantial funding unavailable elsewhere and the opportunity to 
work on the best technology, the question is the extent to which UK support will continue if 
U.S. defense budgets fall and the U.S. technological edge decreases.  And the final 
arrangements for JSF logistical support and the extent to which non-U.S. firms will be able 
to participate are critical factors which will warrant future research.  If the long-term benefits 
for UK firms on JSF support are far less than anticipated, that will have an impact on the 
extent of UK enthusiasm for participating in U.S.-led projects and putting up with ITAR. 
The third and final comparison is arguably the one which is of greatest utility, 
particularly to the U.S.: what type of export control regime does the U.S. have, and what 
type of regime should it have?  UK participants recognized the need for the U.S. to regulate 
sensitive technologies.  They had strong support for efforts by the Obama Administration to 
improve the system in order to enhance security of truly sensitive technology.  Moreover, 
they had suggestions for practical steps on process that could remove unnecessary 
complexity and aggravation.  Simply put, the U.S. may wish to consider what requirements 
and processes support a clear policy goal, and which serve to generate ill-will among some 
of its staunchest supporters. 
The U.S. should not take solace from the responses noted above that the UK is not 
yet ready to opt out of U.S. military projects.  The fact that even in the UK, there is growing 
support for producing ITAR-free items should be a concern to Washington.  If that is the 
extent of the sentiment in the UK, the U.S. should be greatly concerned about views, policy, 
and practice in France, Germany, and other countries.  In the past, the case could be made 
that due to the U.S. dominance on military technology and defense spending, other 
countries and non-U.S. firms were willing to put up with any and all U.S. requirements, no 
matter how aggravating or onerous.  The commentary from UK representatives indicates 
that may no longer be the case.  If the advantages of participation on U.S. projects are 
indeed diminishing, as is perceived by some UK commentators, it would be in the interest of 
the U.S. to eliminate the avoidable disincentives generated by its export control and 
technology transfer regime.  The findings of this research indicate that, from a UK 
perspective, this would mean a U.S. system which is predictable, simple, fair, transparent, 
and focused on truly sensitive technology. 
=
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